W. Patrick Conlon*
4 U. Mich. J.L. Reform 20A (pdf)
In June 2012, the United States Supreme Court found mandatory life-without-parole sentences against juvenile offenders unconstitutional in Miller v. Alabama.1 The Court determined that because children possess “immaturity, impetuosity, and [fail] to appreciate risks and consequences,” they are fundamentally different than adults.2 Although Miller invalidated every juvenile mandatory life-without-parole (JMLWOP) statute across the United States, there is no clear indication regarding whether Miller retroactively applies to juveniles sentenced to mandatory life-without-parole before the Court’s ruling.3 As a result, states are split on whether to apply Miller retroactively.4
Fifteen states have yet to decide whether Miller applies retroactively, while several other states have either (1) declined to give Miller a retroactive effect or (2) passed legislation that does not apply Miller retroactively or provide for resentencing for JMLWOP.5 This Comment evaluates why the States should apply Miller retroactively.
4 U. Mich. J.L. Reform 11A (pdf)
First love is only a little foolishness and a lot of curiosity.
-George Bernard Shaw
Teenagers will explore their sexuality; this is no new phenomenon. However, the ways that teens are exploring their curiosity is changing with technology. This trend has serious repercussions for teens, society, and the law. ‘Sexting’—defined as the act of sending sexually explicit photographs or messages via cell phone1—is one recently-developed means of sexual exploration. The practice overlaps with the production, distribution, and possession of child pornography that is banned by both state and federal law.2 Due to the overlap, minors have been prosecuted under child pornography statutes for producing or sending images of themselves or other minors.3 This is not the proper use of child pornography prosecution, nor is it a solution to the problem of minors sexting. This Comment argues that minors should be a protected class against which child pornography charges cannot be brought. The solution to the sexting problem does not lie in prosecution. Instead, states should incorporate sexting education into state sexual education and health curricula. Education will help ensure that minors are aware of the risks associated with sexting, without being harmed under a statute that is meant to protect them.
4 U. Mich. J.L. Reform 1A (pdf)
This football season, millions of Americans enjoying their favorite pastime might feel pangs of a guilty conscience. Years of scientific research into the long-term neurological effects of tackle football and a recent settlement between the National Football League (NFL) and thousands of retired NFL players1 have made football-related traumatic brain injuries (TBI) a topic of national conversation. Current and former NFL players2 and even President Obama3 have participated in the conversation, saying that they would hesitate to let their sons play the game for fear of possible brain injury. Because research has uncovered signs of permanent brain damage in players as young as eighteen-years-old, and has suggested that everyday subconcussive blows4 during football practice could be the cause of such brain damage,5 one scientist has called for a ban on tackle football at the youth level.6 In light of these findings, current state laws are inadequate to address the very real risks associated with youth tackle football. In general, these laws do not attempt to prevent concussions, but rather address treatment for concussions following the injury. Furthermore, state laws entirely fail to address the daily, subconcussive blows suffered by youth players. To fully protect their youngest football players from the devastating effects of football-related TBIs, state legislators should ban tackle football for children under fourteen-years-old.
3 U. Mich. J.L. Reform 22A (pdf)
Like many cities in the United States, Richmond, California suffered greatly from the recent mortgage crisis. The foreclosure crisis hit Richmond hard in 2009, when more than 2,000 homes in Richmond went into foreclosure.1 This figure is especially shocking given that there were 18,659 owner-occupied housing units in the city at that time.2 In 2012, the city saw an additional 914 foreclosures and a foreclosure rate of thirty out of 1,000 homes (well above the national average of thirteen of every 1,000 homes).3 Today, it is reported that nearly forty-six percent of homes in Richmond are “underwater,” meaning that what is owed on the mortgage is more than the current value of the property.4 Seeking to put an end to the foreclosures, the City of Richmond announced a plan on July 30, 2013 to use the power of eminent domain to buy underwater mortgages from lenders.5 The city plans to buy the mortgages for eighty percent of a home’s current value, a price they believe is high enough to amount to the just compensation that is required by the Fifth Amendment’s protection against the taking of private property.6 Richmond would then convert the acquired mortgages into FHA loans with smaller principals that correspond with the current value of the home.7 FHA loans are insured against default by the Federal Housing Authority (a section of the United States Department of Housing Development) and are issued by private, FHA-approved lenders. On August 7, 2013, several banks representing the bond investors that owned these underwater mortgages filed suit against the city, challenging the plan’s constitutionality. Given the current state of eminent domain law, which allows for eminent domain to be exercised for the public purpose of economic development, some argue that Richmond’s plan passes constitutional scrutiny.8 However, this use pushes the boundaries of legitimate exercise of eminent domain, even under the majority opinion in Kelo v. City of New London, Conn, which confirmed that economic development is proper grounds for states to exercise eminent domain.9
3 U. Mich. J.L. Reform 10A (pdf)
While the Steubenville Rape Case1 garnered much attention for the role that social media played in initiating the prosecution and inciting national outrage, the underlying legal issue was the victim’s incapacity to consent because of self-induced intoxication.2 The case surrounded the August 12, 2012 sexual assault of an intoxicated sixteen-year-old girl by two high school football players, Trent Mays and Ma’lik Richmond, after a party in Steubenville, Ohio.3 Following the prominent coverage of the incident across social media channels and in the news, Mays and Richmond—who were charged with raping the sixteen-year-old girl—were often portrayed as the real victims; observers blamed the female victim for partying and putting herself in a position to be violated.4 Ultimately, the juvenile court held that the victim was so intoxicated that she was unable to give consent, finding Mays and Richmond guilty of rape. Judge Thomas Lipps, who presided over the trial, warned that the young men’s behavior was a “cautionary lesson” in how adolescents conduct themselves in the presence of alcohol.5
3 U. Mich. J.L. Reform 1A (pdf)
Robert Redford recently joined forces with former presidential candidate Bill Richardson to stop the return of horse slaughtering to the United States. Few among us would bet against that duo in their fight for a cause that appears on its face to be unassailably just. Yet, horse slaughtering is a highly complex issue that boasts its fair share of credible supporters, and the activity is poised for a revival after a six-year ban if Redford, Richardson, and various animal rights groups do not win a recently-brought federal lawsuit. This Comment recommends a multi-pronged approach to solving the problem of wild horse overpopulation—the most commonly-raised justification for horse slaughter—but also supports a highly regulated return of slaughter if the wild horse crisis proves to be unsolvable by less bloody means.
Gregory C. Cook*
2 U. Mich. J.L. Reform 104A
This Comment suggests that the upcoming decision by the Supreme Court in American Express Co. v. Italian Colors Restaurant1 will not change the class action landscape. While the plaintiff bar contends that certain public policy goals will be lost as a result of American Express and AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion,2 this Comment argues that, in the correct circumstances, coordinated individual arbitrations can address at least some of these public policy goals and plaintiff counsel should focus on such coordination efforts (including, for instance, ethically recruiting actually-injured plaintiffs, the use of common plaintiff counsel, the use of common experts, and shared discovery).
2 U. Mich. J.L. Reform A100
Last year, a New York federal district court dismissed a lawsuit by Jacoby & Meyers LLP attacking a New York law that prevents non-lawyers from owning an equity interest in law firms.1 On November 21, 2012, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit resuscitated the lawsuit, remanding the case to the district court and granting Jacoby & Meyers LLP leave to amend its complaint.2 Non-lawyers owning an equity interest in law firms is not a new idea, as countries such as Australia and the United Kingdom already allow it,3 and the United States should follow their example to a limited extent. Despite the ethical issues present with non-lawyer equity ownership in law firms,4 this Comment proposes that the ABA, as well as subsequent state law, create a system that allows law firms to get funding from investors without breaching legal ethics rules.
David Korn and David Rosenberg*
2 U. Mich. J.L. Reform A96
As the Carnival Triumph debacle splashed across the national consciousness,1 lawyers shook their heads. Sensationalist news coverage exposed common knowledge in the legal community: cruise passengers have little recourse against carriers, and, as a result, they often bear the brunt of serious physical and financial injuries. Cruise lines, escaping legal accountability for their negligence, sail off undeterred from neglecting passenger safety on future voyages.2 While its previous decisions helped entrench this problem, a recently argued case presents the Supreme Court with another opportunity to address it.3