Sarah Thompson*
Like many cities in the United States, Richmond, California suffered greatly from the recent mortgage crisis. The foreclosure crisis hit Richmond hard in 2009, when more than 2,000 homes in Richmond went into foreclosure.1 This figure is especially shocking given that there were 18,659 owner-occupied housing units in the city at that time.2 In 2012, the city saw an additional 914 foreclosures and a foreclosure rate of thirty out of 1,000 homes (well above the national average of thirteen of every 1,000 homes).3 Today, it is reported that nearly forty-six percent of homes in Richmond are “underwater,” meaning that what is owed on the mortgage is more than the current value of the property.4 Seeking to put an end to the foreclosures, the City of Richmond announced a plan on July 30, 2013 to use the power of eminent domain to buy underwater mortgages from lenders.5 The city plans to buy the mortgages for eighty percent of a home’s current value, a price they believe is high enough to amount to the just compensation that is required by the Fifth Amendment’s protection against the taking of private property.6 Richmond would then convert the acquired mortgages into FHA loans with smaller principals that correspond with the current value of the home.7 FHA loans are insured against default by the Federal Housing Authority (a section of the United States Department of Housing Development) and are issued by private, FHA-approved lenders. On August 7, 2013, several banks representing the bond investors that owned these underwater mortgages filed suit against the city, challenging the plan’s constitutionality. Given the current state of eminent domain law, which allows for eminent domain to be exercised for the public purpose of economic development, some argue that Richmond’s plan passes constitutional scrutiny.8 However, this use pushes the boundaries of legitimate exercise of eminent domain, even under the majority opinion in Kelo v. City of New London, Conn, which confirmed that economic development is proper grounds for states to exercise eminent domain.9 Read More
Alexandra Schiffrin*
While the Steubenville Rape Case1 garnered much attention for the role that social media played in initiating the prosecution and inciting national outrage, the underlying legal issue was the victim’s incapacity to consent because of self-induced intoxication.2 The case surrounded the August 12, 2012 sexual assault of an intoxicated sixteen-year-old girl by two high school football players, Trent Mays and Ma’lik Richmond, after a party in Steubenville, Ohio.3 Following the prominent coverage of the incident across social media channels and in the news, Mays and Richmond—who were charged with raping the sixteen-year-old girl—were often portrayed as the real victims; observers blamed the female victim for partying and putting herself in a position to be violated.4 Ultimately, the juvenile court held that the victim was so intoxicated that she was unable to give consent, finding Mays and Richmond guilty of rape. Judge Thomas Lipps, who presided over the trial, warned that the young men’s behavior was a “cautionary lesson” in how adolescents conduct themselves in the presence of alcohol.5 Read More
Brendan Vandor* Robert Redford recently joined forces with former presidential candidate Bill Richardson to stop the return of horse slaughtering to the United States. Few among us would bet against that duo in their fight for a cause that appears on its face to be unassailably just. Yet, horse slaughtering is a highly complex issue that boasts its fair share of credible supporters, and the activity is poised for a revival after a six-year ban if Redford, Richardson, and various animal rights groups do not win a recently-brought federal lawsuit. This Comment recommends a multi-pronged approach to solving the problem of wild horse overpopulation—the most commonly-raised justification for horse slaughter—but also supports a highly regulated return of slaughter if the wild horse crisis proves to be unsolvable by less bloody means. Read More
James Santiago* United States Marine Corps Sergeant Dakota Meyer said, “When they told me that I would be receiving the Medal of Honor I told them that I didn’t want it, because I don’t feel like a hero.”1 This statement reflects the feelings of many real war heroes who deserve and are given recognition yet feel that they are unworthy of such accolades. Unfortunately, there are also individuals who want the recognition of being a war hero but lie about having served. Nevertheless, the First Amendment will continue to guarantee the freedom of speech of those who lie about unearned military honors unless the government can establish a compelling interest and pass narrowly tailored legislation to effectuate that interest. In this context, the compelling government interest is to protect tangible benefits for veterans from people who lie about military service in an attempt to falsely obtain those benefits. Although there are a limited number of permissible content-based restrictions under the First Amendment—inciting imminent lawless action, defamation, speech integral to criminal conduct, child pornography, and actual threats2—false statements about military awards are not included on that list.3 With that in mind, the Supreme Court held in United States v. Alvarez that the Stolen Valor Act of 2005,4 which made it a crime for anyone to make false claims about receipt of military decorations or medals, was an unconstitutional infringement on protected First Amendment speech.5 Both the Senate and the House, in response to the ruling, proposed amending legislation to the Stolen Valor Act.6 Each amending bill has its own advantages and disadvantages, but a more refined combination of the two bills will be necessary in order for a new Act to be effective and constitutional. Read More
Gregory C. Cook*
This Comment suggests that the upcoming decision by the Supreme Court in American Express Co. v. Italian Colors Restaurant1 will not change the class action landscape. While the plaintiff bar contends that certain public policy goals will be lost as a result of American Express and AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion,2 this Comment argues that, in the correct circumstances, coordinated individual arbitrations can address at least some of these public policy goals and plaintiff counsel should focus on such coordination efforts (including, for instance, ethically recruiting actually-injured plaintiffs, the use of common plaintiff counsel, the use of common experts, and shared discovery). Read More
Brett Novick* Last year, a New York federal district court dismissed a lawsuit by Jacoby & Meyers LLP attacking a New York law that prevents non-lawyers from owning an equity interest in law firms.1 On November 21, 2012, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit resuscitated the lawsuit, remanding the case to the district court and granting Jacoby & Meyers LLP leave to amend its complaint.2 Non-lawyers owning an equity interest in law firms is not a new idea, as countries such as Australia and the United Kingdom already allow it,3 and the United States should follow their example to a limited extent. Despite the ethical issues present with non-lawyer equity ownership in law firms,4 this Comment proposes that the ABA, as well as subsequent state law, create a system that allows law firms to get funding from investors without breaching legal ethics rules. Read More
David Korn and David Rosenberg* As the Carnival Triumph debacle splashed across the national consciousness,1 lawyers shook their heads. Sensationalist news coverage exposed common knowledge in the legal community: cruise passengers have little recourse against carriers, and, as a result, they often bear the brunt of serious physical and financial injuries. Cruise lines, escaping legal accountability for their negligence, sail off undeterred from neglecting passenger safety on future voyages.2 While its previous decisions helped entrench this problem, a recently argued case presents the Supreme Court with another opportunity to address it.3 Read More
Jeremy Garson* Judges are, without question, vital to our justice system. They interpret, adapt, and apply the law. They resolve disputes for the parties to the case at issue and provide guidance to others in analogous situations. They are the gears that keep the wheels of justice moving. Unfortunately, in the case of our federal courts, many of these gears are missing. Eighty-three of our 874 federal judgeships are vacant,1 including thirty-four that have been declared “judicial emergencies.”2 Read More
Colleen Nicholson* Compounding is the act of combining, mixing or altering ingredients to create a drug tailored to the needs of an individual patient, such as a child who needs a less potent dose, an elderly patient who has trouble swallowing, or an individual with a severe allergy to a drug component. Compounding pharmacies, which engage in large-scale drug compounding, have come under the microscope recently because of the ongoing deadly outbreak of fungal meningitis that began in 2012. Fungal meningitis “occurs when the protective membranes covering the brain and spinal cord are infected with a fungus.”1 The recent outbreak was caused by steroid shots contaminated with so much fungus that in some cases the fungus particles were visible to the naked eye.2 A single compounding pharmacy in Framingham, Massachusetts, the New England Compounding Center, “shipped 17,676 vials of … potentially contaminated [steroid] solution to 75 clinics in 23 states.”3 As of March 4, 2013, the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) had linked 720 cases of meningitis or other complications, including forty-eight deaths, in twenty states to the epidural steroid injections that all originated from the New England Compounding Center.4 Read More
Brian Wolfman* I. The Problem
I represent a national non-profit consumer rights organization, as an amicus, in a federal appeal challenging a district court’s approval of a class-action settlement of claims under the federal Credit Repair Organization Act (CROA).1 My client maintains that the district court erred in finding that the settlement was “fair, reasonable, and adequate,” which is the standard for class-action settlement approval under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.2 In particular, we argue that the district court committed a reversible legal error when it deferred to the class-action lawyers’ recommendation to approve the settlement because, in those lawyers’ view, it was fair, reasonable, and adequate. We also argue that the district court erred when, in approving the settlement, it relied in part on its belief that the plaintiffs’ counsel, whose work the judge had observed for years, are really good lawyers. Read More
